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The Mediterranean is a border between a wealthy, developed, and stable Europe
on one side and a fragmented North Africa and Middle East on the other side. Today,
in the region there is no major military threat as was the case in Europe during the
Cold War. However, the region is destabilized by a combination of wide-ranging
inter-state and intra-state conflicts, socioeconomic risks and low-intensity violence.
Most of these conflicts and risks have their sources along the south shore and at the
sub-regional levels. The first category of conflicts is constituted by territorial and
border disputes such as those between Israel and Palestine; Israel and Syria; Israel and
Lebanon; Greece and Turkey; Turkey and Syria; Egypt and Sudan; Spain and
Morocco; and those in the Western Sahara1. The second category is represented by
ethno-cultural rivalry as in the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and that which is part of
the Kurdish question. To this list we add the low-intensity violence of terrorism in
Algeria and Egypt. However, we should also not overlook the future importance of
potential conflicts over water supply, particularly in the Middle East among Turkey,
Syria, Iraq, Israel and its neighbors, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia where in some cases
the situation is complicated by the fact that there are connections between the territorial
and ethno-cultural sources of conflicts, for example, the Greek-Turk rivalry and the
Arab-Israeli dispute, whose cases belong to the category of “intractable conflicts”2.
The geopolitical environment described above illustrates the specificity of the security
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issues in the Mediterranean and the difficulty in duplicating the East-West model of
conflict prevention and management.
How to prevent conflicts in the Mediterranean? Are there any models of conflict
prevention suitable for the Euro-Mediterranean Region (EMR)? With this prospect in
mind, there is a need for innovative thinking which would not only take into account
conflict prevention experiments elsewhere, particularly within the CSCE / OSCE
framework, but also keep in mind the specificity of the Mediterranean.
Firstly, this paper attempts an evaluation of the cooperative security policies put
forth in the region since the Euro-Arab Dialogue began. From this historical perspective,
it then proposes ways and means for common actions to prevent and manage conflicts
in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
THE SEARCH FOR COOPERATIVE 
SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
One should first of all take note of the fragmentation of the trans-Mediterranean
cooperation which has involved the following institutional frameworks: the CSCE, the
Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Five + Five, the CSCM, the ACFIS, and the Mediterranean
Forum. In one way or another, most of these initiatives have failed in establishing
mechanisms for conflict prevention and management.
Discussions about “the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Security”
within the CSCE were very limited despite efforts made by some non-aligned countries3,
namely Malta and Yugoslavia. While the issue was included in the Helsinki Final Act,
one does notice that the Mediterranean was not perceived as a region by itself but as
the “Southern Flank” of the European continent.
The first significant attempt to build a trans-Mediterranean model for cooperation
was made through what was called the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Launched in the mid-
seventies between the Arab League and the European Community, this Dialogue failed
despite several meetings which identified some commonalties of purpose. The failure
was mainly due to a deep misunderstanding between the two partners; whereas the
Arab countries emphasized the political dimension of the Dialogue, the Europeans
preferred to focus on economic issues. In 1983, President Mitterand proposed the
development of a trans-Mediterranean cooperation in the Western Mediterranean Basin.
The proposition was defined as realistic because it avoided discussions on sensitive issues
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Greece-Turkey dispute. These initiative lead
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to the Five + Five4 and later to the Twelve + Five negotiations, which placed strong
emphasis on trans-institutional cooperation between the AMU and the then
denominated European Community. However, the question of whether to include
Libya in the process and the freezing of AMU activities might help explain why the
project was delayed. In 1994, a proposal made by Egypt for a Mediterranean Forum
met with limited success. The objective was to establish a framework for political and
economic dialogue between both shores and seemed to be an updated version of the
Euro-Arab Dialogue5. Despite the Egyptian’s efforts, the issue of security was not put
forward during the Forum’s meetings.
The most ambitious proposal was the Spanish-Italian initiative for a Conference
on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM )6. For the first time since the
Helsinki Document, this project established a link between the Mediterranean region
and the CSCE Process. The proposal to construct a global institutional framework for
the Mediterranean equivalent to that of Europe within the CSCE seemed very attractive
but came to be difficult to implement. The specificity of the Mediterranean (as previously
mentioned ) and the existence of a strong process of fragmentation at the sub-regional
level (in the Balkans, South-East Mediterranean and Maghreb) make hypothetical the
success of such a model. As a result, the CSCM is today a deadlocked project, despite
the efforts by the Inter-Parliamentary Union which organized a series of non-
governmental meetings on CSCM7.
After the Gulf War, the United States took the initiative in a series of meetings
under the framework of the Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East (1991),
Conference followed by the Economic Summits in Madrid (1993), Casablanca (1994),
Amman (1995) and Cairo (1996). The objective was to create a Middle East and North
African Economic Community (MENA) that would help Israel to become integrated in
the region. It is significant to note that the first meetings dealing with security issues in
the region, namely the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), were
made possible because of the American pressure on both Arabs and Israelis. Yet, in spite
of the progress in identifying certain confidence-building and arms control measures,
the ACRS has produced limited results in large part due to the boycott by Syria and the
continuing great suspicions that exist between the partners of the Peace process.
Security was also a central issue of concern for the WEU, NATO and OSCE.
Stemming from the Declaration of Petersburg (1992), the WEU proposed a
comprehensive dialogue on security issues that would include the following
Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Mauritania.
Preliminary discussions among the members of the WEU Mediterranean Group did
not, however, produce any significant interest among the dialogue partners, and Egypt
and Turkey, in particular, expressed their reluctance to continue the discussions8. A
similar evolution took place when, on one hand, NATO decided that same year to start
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a dialogue with six selected southern states -Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco,
and Tunisia - with the objective of building a Partnership for Peace in the Mediterranean,
and on the other hand, the OSCE Committee of High Officials decided to invite South
Mediterranean countries to its meetings in 19949. The security dialogue frameworks
proposed by the WEU, NATO and OSCE have a limited chance of success not only
due to the discriminatory selection of partners to be included in the dialogue, but most
of all because of the absence of clearly identified common principles and rules for such
a security dialogue to proceed10. The competition among northern institutions seems
to be the rule since the beginning of the 1990’s, and so the question of coordination
between WEU, NATO and OSCE was raised recently at the WEU Birmingham meeting
(1996), though discussions didn’t lead to any results. From a conflict prevention and
management perspective, the Security Dialogues mentioned here did not produce any
concrete measures since, apparently, the partners themselves did not really seem to be
convinced by any of the proposals.
The most recent and serious initiative to build a regional framework for cooperative
security in the Mediterranean was launched at the Barcelona Conference (November
1995). Based on the idea that the EMR needs a comprehensive security and cooperation
approach, the initiative resulted in the twenty seven participants11 at the meeting
adopting a Declaration which defined three baskets for Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
covering issues of security, economy and society. With respect to the security basket,
the partners expressed their conviction that the objective is to build an “area of peace
and stability in the Mediterranean including the long term possibility of establishing
a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end”. From the Barcelona Declaration perspective,
what kind of measures for conflict prevention and management are needed and feasible?
BUILDING SECURITY PARTNERSHIP THROUGH
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
Conflict prevention and management (CPM) has become an important issue in
the discussion of the post- Cold War security framework. While a wide range of CPM
measures have been experimented within Europe (e.g.: the former Yugoslavia and
Caucasus) with more or less success12, there is a need for a joint study on the lessons
that can be drawn from the European experience (CSCE / OSCE). CPM measures
should not only be adapted to the nature of the conflict (intra-state versus inter-state
conflict) but also analyze the roots of the conflict. In addition, they should take into
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account the life span or stages of the conflict: a pre-conflict situation calls for preventive
action; an in-conflict scenario requires actions towards crisis management and resolution;
and a post-conflict situation needs peace-enforcement actions.
The Barcelona Document emphasizes the need for common action regarding
conflict prevention. The participants undertook to:
- “consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between
the Parties “;
- “refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defense requirements
“ including “practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms “.
The first point deals with the concept of transparency while the second treats the
concept of sufficiency.
Transparency
The East-West model for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was based on
the definition of principles and rules which could lead to better transparency and
predictability. From a conflict prevention and management prospect, three issues seem
of particular interest: the institutionalization of a dialogue on security issues, cooperation
towards early-warning, and peacekeeping.
Comprehensive Security Dialogue 
The issue of security perceptions between the north and the south shores of the
Mediterranean should be raised. In the North, there is a wide-spread feeling that Western
civilization is threatened by “multidimensional” and “multidirectional” phenomena
emanating from the South, such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and ballistic
weapons, immigration pressures13, terrorism, and Islamic fundamentalism. The ‘enemy’
is still present but now he is wearing a green coat. From the southern viewpoint the North
is seen as being responsible for the instability in the price of energy and raw materials,
debt pressures, cultural intrusion, racism, and xenophobia. These types of ‘distortions’
of each other’s perceptions should be examined, beginning with the idea that faulty
perceptions are partly due to the lack of information about each other’s intentions.
When talking about security issues in the Mediterranean one notices that a major
handicap is the lack of any common definition of ‘security’. Response to a security threat
should not be based on an imposed formula that carries with it the risk of being perceived
as intrusive in the eyes of the southern countries: Rather such a response should be based
on a co-operative approach that parts from a common definition of risks and responses.
In the first place, there are needed mechanisms for political consultation on security
issues so that partners might exchange views about conflicts which take place in the
region. In this sense, the possibility of establishing a “well-structured, gradually evolving
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political consultation process”14 proposed by WEU should be explored further. The
priority here is to put to rest the perceptions of the ‘enemy image’ that runs along the
North-South axis, while also defining “rules of behavior to steer good-neighborly relations
among States and groups of States”15. Such measures as planning for mutual participation
in meetings and seminars about the conceptual and practical aspects of conflict
management would appear to be necessary at the first stage. The Security Dialogue should
likewise lead to joint studies that look at the new risks and threats to regional peace and
security plus view the responses to such challenges, thus helping to define a common
approach towards dealing with sources of insecurity in the region.
In order to help identify CBM measures that could contribute to better transparency
and predictability in the EMR, the Dialogue’s priority should be given to the first and
second generations of CBMs (Helsinki Final Document 1975 and Stockholm Document
1986) regarding the exchange of information concerning military missions, inspections
and monitoring, and the discussion over national military doctrines and forces
deployment. In this light, one notices that NATO’s new concepts of “multidimensional”
and “multidirectional” risks - arguments for the restructuring of the Alliance’s Southern
Flank forces (AFSOUTH) - were perceived with great fear by most of the southern
Mediterranean countries precisely because of the lack of communication between the
Alliance and the south shore countries. There is also a need for transparency and
openness on the objectives of military forces like EUROFORCE and EUROMARFOR16
which are being developed within the WEU Petersburg framework.
Other measures of transparency that could be adopted within the EMR are, in
the first place, a common decision by all participants to report to the UN Register of
Conventional Arms and to the UN Instrument on Military Budget and, in the second
place, the adoption of a third generation of CBMs to deal with constraints on the
provisions on military activities (i.e., non-provocative military postures) and the issue
of using military force as an instrument to deal with “threats to peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression” as stated in the United Nation’s Charter, Chapter VII, as
well as measures to address demilitarized zones and zones of reduced military activities.
Early-warning 
The need for a regional early-warning system that could be organized as a network
and function as an interstate communication center should be examined. As a mechanism
for gathering and analyzing information, this network would serve primarily to identify
a potential crisis and to provide decision-makers with information that might help
manage a conflict in development. Such a system could benefit from information
transmitted via satellites; and, quite useful from a conflict prevention and management
prospect, it may also be possible to reinforce this system by utilizing a satellite image
interpretation agency for arms control monitoring.  An efficient early-warning system
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requires “intelligence sharing” and thus requires the development of a computerized
data base.  Prior to that action would be the establishment of an ad hoc working group
responsible for research and analysis to be used for diplomatic decision-making. An
early-warning system might then work as an instrument for analysis and advice, helping
governments in their decisions with respect to the taking of a wide range of measures
such as fact-finding missions, deployment of peacekeeping forces (including preventive
deployment), and the monitoring of CBMs and arms control agreements to deal with
emerging threats to regional peace and security. Such a body could also serve as an
early-warning system to prevent and/or manage humanitarian crisis ( famines, diseases
and population movements), ecological disasters (nuclear and chemical accidents), in
addition to predicting and analyzing macro-economic factors like inflation,
unemployment, access to raw materials, water, energy, markets and other factors that
have an impact on stability and security in the EMR.
Peacekeeping 
An important aspect of CBM - peacekeeping operations - as well as the question
of the feasibility and desirability of common Peace Forces should both be discussed
within the EMR Security Partnership. Though it may be necessary at first to exchange
experiences on peacekeeping, the next step would consist of determining the rules of
engagement for common peacekeeping operations ‘in’ or ‘out-of-area’, probably in
sub-Saharan Africa. It is widely acknowledged that peacekeeping forces can be used for
different missions - to carry out humanitarian functions, to patrol borders and other
sensitive areas, to establish a buffer zone between adversarial military forces, and to
protect enclaves of ethnic minorities. Arab countries can benefit from the experience
and expertise of Europeans concerning peacekeeping while NATO and WEU might
make their resources available (logistical and technical assistance) in support of those
carrying out common peacekeeping activities. The participation of Egyptian and
Jordanian units in the Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia might well be seen as an
interesting experiment of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in peacekeeping -
participation which also speaks amply to the potential for common conflict management
actions in the future.
Sufficiency
Finally, cooperation for arms control is also an important aspect in conflict prevention
and conflict avoidance. By reducing the military capabilities that go beyond legitimate
national security needs, states can express their peaceful intentions. Accordingly, concepts
such as “military sufficiency” should be defined and clarified for implementation within
the EMR since, as was the case during the Cold War, arms control measures can and do
offer great opportunities for military cooperation between states.
59
A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mediterranean
Fundació CIDOB, 1997
Horizontal Versus Vertical Non-Proliferation 
Despite the great disproportion in the military capabilities between the north and
south Mediterranean shores in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons, the northern
discourses on arms control issues emphasize military threats from the southern shore.
In fact, the European approach towards arms control and disarmament issues in the
Mediterranean region focuses on non-proliferation and the need for control of transfers
of military technologies. The Europeans have usually proposed that arms control
measures for the Mediterranean consist in the prevention of uncontrolled proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction by way of strengthening the NPT regime, pressuring
the southern states to sign the chemical weapons convention, and improving the
mechanisms for control of the MTCR regime17. It should be noted, however, that these
measures are mainly based on a “horizontal non-proliferation” conception and limit
themselves to a particular aspect of arms control which does not even mention
disarmament. If it is commonly acknowledged that the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is a threat to international security, the question of deployment of
such arms in the North (the so-called ‘vertical proliferation’) should therefore also be
raised. What’s more, non-proliferation policies ought not to be used as a means for
restricting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge needed by southern
countries for these countries’ domestic development. The best way to promote non-
proliferation is neither through technical measures nor via unilateral actions, rather it
is through political channels that respond to the sources of insecurity in the south shore.
A Regional Program for Disarmament
What arms control and disarmament measures are suitable to the Mediterranean
region? It is of particular interest for the region to adopt a realistic and pragmatic
approach based on the concepts of “non- diminished security” and “equal security”.
As part of such an approach, the same realism and pragmatism should be applied when
discussing nuclear, chemical and biological arms control and disarmament measures,
where in such cases it would also be necessary to agree upon specific measures to be
implemented at both the regional (North-South context) and sub-regional levels (South-
South context). Because of the sensitive nature of disarmament, we consider it
appropriate to adopt a step by step policy with short, middle, and long-term programs.
At the end of this approximately twenty year period, the Mediterranean region will
then became a zone free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction
and will operate within a comprehensive regional security system.
During the first phase (about five years implementation time), each Euro-
Mediterranean state would commit itself to subscribing to the instruments for non-
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (NPT, CWC, BWC) and
also to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Priority should also be given to
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the full implementation of the African nuclear weapons-free zone (Pelindaba Treaty)
and to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East.  Undeniable is the fact that the creation of such zones would have a positive
impact on the de-nuclearization of the Mediterranean region.
The second stage of the program (time of implementation - five years) would lead to
the adoption of measures calling for major cuts in the number of long-range nuclear ballistic
missiles. Any decision to resume production of nuclear materials for military purposes
should be a prior issue of discussion at the regional and, also, global levels. Parallel in time,
it would be necessary to draft agreements concerning naval arms control and disarmament.
The third phase (time of implementation - ten years) would consist of efforts
towards implementing a regional peace and security system and completing the de-
nuclearization of the Mediterranean and Euro-Mediterranean region. Agreements as
to the instruments for carrying out the elimination or limitation of all destabilizing
weapons systems would be a central issue for discussion. Finally, this would be the time
to establish a regional security system that allows for efficient verification mechanisms
to function. At the end of this twenty year process, each state will then (ideally) maintain
only the military forces and arms it needs for self-defense and for fulfilling its obligations
for peacekeeping operations under The UN Charter.
CLOSING REMARKS
Although we have focused here on the military dimension of security, nobody
would deny the fact that political, economic and social factors are also relevant to
security and may indeed constitute sources of instability.
Potential for conflict prevention and management does exist in the Mediterranean
but, despite great hope and concern by most of the Mediterranean states, the Barcelona
Process has its own limitations due, for instance, to the absence of institutional
mechanisms for implementing the principles and rules contained in the Barcelona
Declaration. This issue was raised during the second Euro-Mediterranean Conference
that took place in Malta (April 1997); still, discussions didn’t lead to any significant
institutional progress. Today, the EMR partners are confronting major questions not
the least of which is the following: Israel seems very reluctant towards participating in
a process that would be incompatible in one way or another with its exclusive security
ties with the United States, and inasmuch as the United States’ security interests in the
Middle East are based on overwhelming military capability, such capability gives to
this country enough leverage for influencing any trans-Mediterranean security framework.
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Notes
1. James Baker was recently nominated as the UN envoy for the Western Sahara.
2. For this concept see Kriesberg, L.(1989) Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation, Syracuse
University Press.
3. See Biad, A. “Les pays non-alignés et la sécurité en Mediterranée” in Sécurité, désarmement
et le flanc sud de l’Alliance atlantique, Observatoire stratégique méditerranéen, Cahier, No. 1,
Nice, pp.79-87.
4. France, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal on one side and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania
and Tunisia on the other side. 
5. Algeria, Egypt, Spain, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Turkey.
6. Proposal put forward at the CSCE meeting in Palma de Mallorca, September 1990.
7. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Final Document Valletta Conference, 1-4 November 1995.
8. See Western European Union, “Security in the Mediterranean Region”, Report for the Assembly
of the WEU, document 1548, 42nd session, November 1996, pp.7- 27. 
9. Invitations for participation to the OSCE meetings were sent to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco
and Tunisia. 
10. In the case of the NATO Partnership for Peace, Algeria, Libya and Syria were excluded from the
Dialogue.
11. Libya and the States of the former Federation of Yugoslavia were not invited to the meeting.
The United States was granted observer status.
12. From a conceptual perspective see Werner B. and Luc R.(1994) The Art of Conf1ict Prevention,
London: Brassey’s, p. 218. See also Michael S. L. (1996) Preventing Vio1ent Conflicts, A Strategy
for Preventive Diplomacy, Washington: US Institute for Peace Press, p 220.
13. The WEU Assembly in its Report on Parliamentary Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region
consider this question as a “ threat to regional security “, doc.1485, 6 November 1995.
14. See Action Plan of the Barcelona Process.
15. Ibid.
16. An Agreement on the constitutions of EUROFORCE and EUROMARFOR was signed by France,
Italy and Spain on the 15th of May 1995 in Paris.
17. WE the Mediterranean, Roseta Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, Document
1371, 24 May 1993.
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